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Abstract
Solomonoff unified Occam’s razor and Epicurus’ principle of multiple expla-
nations to one elegant, formal, universal theory of inductive inference, which
initiated the field of algorithmic information theory. His central result is
that the posterior of the universal semimeasure M converges rapidly to the
true sequence generating posterior µ, if the latter is computable. Hence, M
is eligible as a universal predictor in case of unknown µ. The first part of
the paper investigates the existence and convergence of computable universal
(semi)measures for a hierarchy of computability classes: recursive, estimable,
enumerable, and approximable. For instance, M is known to be enumerable,
but not estimable, and to dominate all enumerable semimeasures. We present
proofs for discrete and continuous semimeasures. The second part investi-
gates more closely the types of convergence, possibly implied by universality:
in difference and in ratio, with probability 1, in mean sum, and for Martin-
Lo¨f random sequences. We introduce a generalized concept of randomness for
individual sequences and use it to exhibit difficulties regarding these issues.
In particular, we show that convergence fails (holds) on generalized-random
sequences in gappy (dense) Bernoulli classes.
Keywords
Sequence prediction; Algorithmic Information Theory; Solomonoff’s prior;
universal probability; mixture distributions; posterior convergence; com-
putability concepts; Martin-Lo¨f randomness.
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1 Introduction
All induction problems can be phrased as sequence prediction tasks. This is, for
instance, obvious for time-series prediction, but also includes classification tasks.
Having observed data xt at times t < n, the task is to predict the t-th symbol xt
from sequence x = x1...xt−1. The key concept to attack general induction prob-
lems is Occam’s razor (simplicity) principle, which says that “Entities should not
be multiplied beyond necessity.” and to a less extent Epicurus’ principle of multiple
explanations. The former/latter may be interpreted as to keep the simplest/all the-
ories consistent with the observations x1...xt−1 and to use these theories to predict
xt. Kolmogorov (and others) defined the complexity of a string as the length of its
shortest description on a universal Turing machine. The Kolmogorov complexity
K is an excellent universal complexity measure, suitable for quantifying Occam’s
razor. There is (only) one disadvantage: K is not computable.
More precisely, a function f is said to be recursive (or finitely computable) if
there exists a Turing machine that, given x, computes f(x) and then halts. Some
functions are not recursive but still approximable (or limit-computable) in the sense
that there is a nonhalting Turing machine with an infinite (x-dependent) output
sequence y1,y2,y3,... and limt→∞yt = f(x). If additionally the output sequence is
monotone increasing/decreasing, then f is said to be lower/upper semicomputable
(or enumerable/co-enumerable). Finally we call f estimable if some Turing machine,
given x and a precision ε, finitely computes an ε-approximation of x. The major
algorithmic property of K is that it is co-enumerable, but not recursive.
More suitable for predictions is Solomonoff’s [Sol64, Sol78] universal prior M(x)
defined as the probability that the output of a universal monotone Turing machine
U starts with string x when provided with fair coin flips on the input tape. M(x)
is enumerable and roughly 2−K(x), hence implementing Occam’s and also Epicurus’
principles.
Assume now that strings x are sampled from a probability distribution µ, i.e. the
probability of a string starting with x shall be µ(x). The probability of observing xt
at time t, given past observations x1...xt−1 is µ(xt|x1...xt−1)=µ(x1...xt)/µ(x1...xt−1).
Solomonoff’s [Sol78] central result is that the universal posterior M(xt|x1...xt−1)=
M(x1...xt)/M(x1...xt−1) converges rapidly to the true (objective) posterior probabil-
ity µ(xt|x1...xt−1), if µ is an estimable measure, hence M can be used for predictions
in case of unknown µ. One representation of M is as a 2−K(µ)-weighted sum of all
enumerable “defective” probability measures, called semimeasures. The (from this
representation obvious) dominance M(x)≥ 2−K(µ)µ(x) for all enumerable µ is the
central ingredient in the convergence proof.
Dominance and convergence immediately generalize to arbitrary weighted sums
of (semi)measures of some arbitrary countable set M. So what is so special about
the class of all enumerable semimeasures Msemienum? The larger we choose M the
less restrictive is the essential assumption thatM should contain the true distribu-
tion µ. Why not restrict to the still rather general class of estimable or recursive
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(semi)measures? For every countable class M and ξM(x) := ∑ν∈Mwνν(x) with
wν > 0, the important dominance ξM(x)≥wνν(x) ∀ν ∈M is satisfied. The ques-
tion is what properties ξM possesses. The distinguishing property of Msemienum is
that M = ξMsemienum is itself an element of Msemienum. On the other hand, for prediction,
ξM∈M is not by itself an important property. What matters is whether ξM is com-
putable (in one of the senses we defined above) to avoid getting into the (un)realm
of non-constructive math.
Our first contribution is to classify the existence of generalized computable
(semi)measures. From [ZL70] we know that there is an enumerable semimeasure
(namely M) that dominates all enumerable semimeasures in Msemienum. We show
that there is no estimable semimeasure that dominates all recursive measures (also
mentioned in [ZL70]), and there is no approximable semimeasure that dominates all
approximable measures. From this it follows that for a universal (semi)measure that
at least satisfies the weakest form of computability, namely being approximable, the
largest dominated class among the classes considered in this work is the class of enu-
merable semimeasures. This is the distinguishing property of Msemienum and M . This
investigation was motivated by recent generalizations of Kolmogorov complexity and
Solomonoff’s prior by Schmidhuber [Sch00, Sch02].
The second contribution is to investigate more closely the types of convergence,
possibly implied by universality: in difference and in ratio, with probability 1, in
mean sum, and for Martin-Lo¨f random sequences. We introduce a generalized con-
cept of randomness for individual sequences and use it to exhibit difficulties regard-
ing these issues. More concretely, we consider countable classes M of Bernoulli
environments and show that ξM converges to µ on all generalized random sequences
if and only if the class is dense.
Contents. In Section 2 we review various computability concepts and discuss their
relation. In Section 3 we define the prefix Kolmogorov complexity K, the concept of
(semi)measures, Solomonoff’s universal prior M , and explain its universality. Sec-
tion 4 summarizes Solomonoff’s major convergence result, discusses general mixture
distributions and the important universality property – multiplicative dominance.
In Section 5 we define seven classes of (semi)measures based on four computability
concepts. Each class may or may not contain a (semi)measures that dominates all
elements of another class. We reduce the analysis of these 49 cases to four basic
cases. Domination (essentially by M) is known to be true for two cases. The other
two cases do not allow for domination. In Section 7 we investigate more closely the
type of convergence implied by universality. We summarize the result on posterior
convergence in difference (ξ−µ→0) and improve the previous result [LV97] on the
convergence in ratio ξ/µ→1 by showing rapid convergence without use of martin-
gales. In Section 8 we investigate whether convergence for all Martin-Lo¨f random
sequences could hold. We define a generalized concept of randomness for individual
sequences and use it to show that proofs based on universality cannot decide this
question. Section 9 concludes the paper.
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Notation. We denote strings of length n over finite alphabet X by x= x1x2...xn
with xt ∈ X and further abbreviate x1:n := x1x2...xn−1xn and x<n := x1...xn−1, ǫ
for the empty string, ℓ(x) for the length of string x, and ω= x1:∞ for infinite se-
quences. We write xy for the concatenation of string x with y. We abbreviate
limn→∞[f(n)−g(n)]=0 by f(n)n→∞−→ g(n) and say f converges to g, without imply-
ing that limn→∞g(n) itself exists. We write f(x)☎g(x) for g(x) =O(f(x)), i.e. if
∃c>0:f(x)≥cg(x)∀x.
2 Computability Concepts
We define several computability concepts weaker than can be captured by halting
Turing machines.
Definition 1 (Computable functions) We consider functions f :IN→IR:
f is recursive or finitely computable iff there are Turing machines T1/2 with
output interpreted as natural numbers and f(x)= T1(x)
T2(x)
,
f is approximable or limit-computable iff ∃ recursive φ(·,·) with limt→∞φ(x,t)=
f(x).
f is enumerable or lower semicomputable iff additionally φ(x,t)≤φ(x,t+1).
f is co-enumerable or upper semicomputable iff [−f ] is lower semicomputable.
f is semicomputable iff f is lower- or upper semicomputable.
f is estimable iff f is lower- and upper semicomputable.
If f is estimable we can finitely compute an ε-approximation of f by upper and
lower semicomputing f and terminating when differing by less than ε. This means
that there is a Turing machine which, given x and ε, finitely computes yˆ∈ IQ such
that |yˆ−f(x)|< ε. Moreover it gives an interval estimate f(x) ∈ [yˆ−ε,yˆ+ε]. An
estimable integer-valued function is recursive (take any ε< 1
2
). Note that if f is only
approximable or semicomputable we can still come arbitrarily close to f(x) but we
cannot devise a terminating algorithm that produces an ε-approximation. In the
case of lower/upper semicomputability we can at least finitely compute lower/upper
bounds to f(x). In case of approximability, the weakest computability form, even
this capability is lost.
recursive=
finitely
computable
⇒ estimable
⇒
enumerable=
lower semi-
computable ⇒
⇒ co-enumerable=
upper semi-
computable
⇒
semi-
computable
⇒ approximable=
limit-computable
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What we call estimable/recursive/finitely computable is often just called computable,
but it makes sense to separate the concepts in this work, since finite computability
is conceptually easier and some previous results have only been proved for this case.
Sometimes we us the word computable generically for some of the computability
forms of Definition 1.
3 The Universal Prior M
The prefix Kolmogorov complexity K(x) is defined as the length of the shortest bi-
nary (prefix) program p∈{0,1}∗ for which a universal prefix Turing machine U (with
binary program tape and X ary output tape) outputs string x∈X ∗, and similarly
K(x|y) in case of side information y [Kol65, Lev74, Ga´c74, Cha75]:
K(x) = min{ℓ(p) : U(p) = x}, K(x|y) = min{ℓ(p) : U(p, y) = x}
Solomonoff [Sol64, Eq.(7)] defined (earlier) the closely related quantity, the universal
posterior M(y|x)=M(xy)/M(x). The universal prior M(x) can be defined as the
probability that the output of a universal monotone Turing machine U starts with
x when provided with fair coin flips on the input tape. Formally, M can be defined
as
M(x) :=
∑
p : U(p)=x∗
2−ℓ(p) (1)
where the sum is over minimal programs p for which U outputs a string starting
with x. The so-called minimal programs are defined similarly to the prefix programs,
but U need not to halt, which is indicated by the ∗. Minimal programs are those
which are left to the input head in the moment when U wrote the last bit of x
[LV97, Hut04]. Before we can discuss the stochastic properties of M we need the
concept of (semi)measures for strings.
Definition 2 (Continuous (Semi)measures) µ(x) denotes the probability that a
sequence starts with string x. We call µ≥0 a (continuous) semimeasure if µ(ǫ)≤1
and µ(x)≥∑a∈Xµ(xa), and a (probability) measure if equalities hold.
The reason for calling µ with the above property a probability measure is that it
satisfies Kolmogorov’s axioms of probability in the following sense: The sample space
is X∞ with elements ω=ω1ω2ω3...∈X∞ being infinite sequences over alphabet X .
The set of events (the σ-algebra) is defined as the set generated from the cylinder
sets Γx1:n := {ω : ω1:n = x1:n} by countable union and complement. A probability
measure µ is uniquely defined by giving its values µ(Γx1:n) on the cylinder sets,
which we abbreviate by µ(x1:n). We will also call µ a measure, or even more loose
a probability distribution.
We have
∑
a∈XM(xa) <M(x) because there are programs p that output x, not
followed by any a∈X . They just stop after printing x or continue forever without
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any further output. Together with M(ǫ)= 1 this shows that M is a semimeasure,
but not a probability measure. We can now state the fundamental property of M
[ZL70, Sol78]:
Theorem 3 (Universality of M) The universal prior M is an enumerable
semimeasure that multiplicatively dominates all enumerable semimeasures in the
sense that M(x) ☎ 2−K(ρ) ·ρ(x) for all enumerable semimeasures ρ. M is enu-
merable, but not estimable (nor recursive).
The Kolmogorov complexity of a function like ρ is defined as the length of the
shortest self-delimiting code of a Turing machine computing this function in the
sense of Definition 1. Up to a multiplicative constant, M assigns higher probability
to all x than any other computable probability distribution.
It is possible to normalize M to a true probability measure Mnorm [Sol78, LV97]
with dominance still being true, but at the expense of giving up enumerability
(Mnorm is still approximable). M is more convenient when studying algorithmic
questions, but a true probability measure likeMnorm is more convenient when study-
ing stochastic questions.
4 Universal Sequence Prediction
In which sense doesM incorporate Occam’s razor and Epicurus’ principle of multiple
explanations? Since the shortest programs p dominate the sum in M , M(x) is
roughly equal to 2−K(x) (M(x) = 2−K(x)+O(K(ℓ(x))), i.e. M assigns high probability
to simple strings. More useful is to think of x as being the observed history. We
see from (1) that every program p consistent with history x is allowed to contribute
to M (Epicurus). On the other hand, shorter programs give significantly larger
contribution (Occam). How does all this affect prediction? If M(x) describes our
(subjective) prior belief in x, then M(y|x) :=M(xy)/M(x) must be our posterior
belief in y. From the symmetry of algorithmic information K(xy)≈K(y|x)+K(x),
and M(x)≈2−K(x) and M(xy)≈2−K(xy) we get M(y|x)≈2−K(y|x). This tells us that
M predicts y with high probability iff y has an easy explanation, given x (Occam &
Epicurus).
The above qualitative discussion should not create the impression that M(x)
and 2−K(x) always lead to predictors of comparable quality. Indeed, in the on-
line/incremental setting, K(y)=O(1) invalidates the consideration above. The proof
of (3) below, for instance, depends on M being a semimeasure and the chain rule
being exactly true, neither of them is satisfied by 2−K(x). See [Hut03b] for a detailed
analysis.
Sequence prediction algorithms try to predict the continuation xt∈X of a given
sequence x1...xt−1. The following bound shows that M predicts computable se-
quences well:
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∞∑
t=1
(1−M(xt|x<t))2 ≤ −12
∞∑
t=1
lnM(xt|x<t) = −12 lnM(x1:∞) ≤ 12 ln 2 ·Km(x1:∞),
(2)
where the monotone complexity Km(x1:∞) =min{ℓ(p) : U(p) = x1:∞} is defined as
the length of the shortest (nonhalting) program computing x1:∞ [ZL70, Lev73]. In
the first inequality we have used (1−a)2 ≤−1
2
lna for 0 ≤ a≤ 1. In the equality
we exchanged the sum with the logarithm and eliminated the resulting product by
the chain rule. In the last inequality we used M(x)≥ 2−Km(x), which follows from
(1) by dropping all terms in
∑
p except for the shortest p computing x. If x1:∞
is a computable sequence, then Km(x1:∞) is finite, which implies M(xt|x<t)→ 1
(
∑∞
t=1(1−at)2<∞⇒at→1). This means, that if the environment is a computable
sequence (whichsoever, e.g. the digits of π or e in X ary representation), after having
seen the first few digits, M correctly predicts the next digit with high probability,
i.e. it recognizes the structure of the sequence.
Assume now that the true sequence is drawn from a computable probability
distribution µ, i.e. the true (objective) probability of x1:t is µ(x1:t). The probability
of xt given x<t hence is µ(xt|x<t)=µ(x1:t)/µ(x<t). Solomonoff’s [Sol78] central result
is that M converges to µ. More precisely, for binary alphabet, he showed that
∞∑
t=1
∑
x<t∈{0,1}t−1
µ(x<t)
(
M(0|x<t)− µ(0|x<t)
)2 ≤ 1
2
ln 2·K(µ) +O(1) < ∞. (3)
The infinite sum can only be finite if the difference M(0|x<t)−µ(0|x<t) tends to
zero for t→∞ with µ-probability 1 (see Definition 10(i) and [Hut01] or Section 7 for
general alphabet). This holds for any computable probability distribution µ. The
reason for the astonishing property of a single (universal) function to converge to
any computable probability distribution lies in the fact that the set of µ-random
sequences differ for different µ. Past data x<t are exploited to get a (with t→∞)
improving estimate M(xt|x<t) of µ(xt|x<t).
The universality property (Theorem 3) is the central ingredient in the proof of
(3). The proof involves the construction of a semimeasure ξ whose dominance is
obvious. The hard part is to show its enumerability and equivalence to M . Let M
be the (countable) set of all enumerable semimeasures and define
ξ(x) :=
∑
ν∈M
2−K(ν)ν(x). (4)
Then dominance
ξ(x) ≥ 2−K(ν)ν(x) ∀ ν ∈M (5)
is obvious. Is ξ lower semicomputable? To answer this question one has to
be more precise. Levin [ZL70] has shown that the set of all lower semicom-
putable semimeasures is enumerable (with repetitions). For this (ordered multi)
set M=Msemienum :={ν1,ν2,ν3,...} and K(νi) :=K(i) one can easily see that ξ is lower
semicomputable. Finally proving M(x)☎ξ(x) also establishes universality ofM (see
[Sol78, LV97] for details).
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The advantage of ξ over M is that it immediately generalizes to arbitrary
weighted sums of (semi)measures for arbitrary countable M.
5 Universal (Semi)Measures
What is so special about the set of all enumerable semimeasuresMsemienum? The larger
we choose M the less restrictive is the assumption thatM should contain the true
distribution µ, which will be essential throughout the paper. Why do not restrict
to the still rather general class of estimable or recursive (semi)measures? It is clear
that for every countable (multi)set M, the universal or mixture distribution
ξ(x) := ξM(x) :=
∑
ν∈M
wνν(x) with
∑
ν∈M
wν ≤ 1 and wν > 0 (6)
dominates all ν∈M. This dominance is necessary for the desired convergence ξ→µ
similarly to (3). The question is what properties ξ possesses. The distinguishing
property of Msemienum is that ξ is itself an element of Msemienum. When concerned with
predictions, ξM∈M is not by itself an important property, but whether ξ is com-
putable in one of the senses of Definition 1. We define
M1 ☎M2 :⇔ there is an element of M1 that dominates all elements of M2
:⇔ ∃ρ∈M1 ∀ν∈M2 ∃wν>0 ∀x : ρ(x)≥wνν(x).
☎ is transitive (but not necessarily reflexive) in the sense thatM1☎M2☎M3 implies
M1☎M3 and M0 ⊇M1☎M2 ⊇M3 implies M0☎M3. For the computability
concepts introduced in Section 2 we have the following proper set inclusions
Mmsrrec ⊂ Mmsrest ≡ Mmsrenum ⊂ Mmsrappr
∩ ∩ ∩ ∩
Msemirec ⊂ Msemiest ⊂ Msemienum ⊂ Msemiappr
where Mmsrc stands for the set of all probability measures of appropri-
ate computability type c ∈ {rec=recursive, est=estimable, enum=enumerable,
appr=approximable}, and similarly for semimeasures Msemic . From an enumera-
tion of a measure ρ one can construct a co-enumeration by exploiting ρ(x1:n)=1−∑
y1:n 6=x1:nρ(y1:n). This shows that every enumerable measure is also co-enumerable,
hence estimable, which proves the identity ≡ above.
With this notation, Theorem 3 implies Msemienum☎Msemienum. Transitivity allows
to conclude, for instance, that Msemiappr☎Mmsrrec , i.e. that there is an approximable
semimeasure that dominates all recursive measures.
The standard “diagonalization” way of provingM1 6☎M2 is to take an arbitrary
µ∈M1 and “increase” it to ρ such that µ 6☎ρ and show that ρ∈M2. There are 7×7
combinations of (semi)measures M1 with M2 for which M1☎M2 could be true or
false. There are four basic cases, explicated in the following theorem, from which
the other 49 combinations displayed in Table 5 follow by transitivity.
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Theorem 4 (Universal (semi)measures) A semimeasure ρ is said to be uni-
versal for M if it multiplicatively dominates all elements of M in the sense
∀ν∃wν>0:ρ(x)≥wνν(x)∀x. The following holds true:
o) ∃ρ : {ρ}☎M: For every countable set of (semi)measures M, there is a
(semi)measure that dominates all elements of M.
i) Msemienum☎Msemienum: The class of enumerable semimeasures contains a universal
element.
ii) Mmsrappr☎Msemienum: There is an approximable measure that dominates all enu-
merable semimeasures.
iii) Msemiest 6☎Mmsrrec : There is no estimable semimeasure that dominates all re-
cursive measures.
iv) Msemiappr 6☎Mmsrappr: There is no approximable semimeasure that dominates all
approximable measures.
Table 5 (Existence of universal (semi)measures) The entry in row r and col-
umn c indicates whether there is an r-able (semi)measure ρ dominating the set
M that contains all c-able (semi)measures, where r,c ∈ {recurs, estimat, enumer,
approxim}. Enumerable measures are estimable. This is the reason why the enum.
row and column in case of measures are missing. The superscript indicates from
which part of Theorem 4 the answer follows. For the bold face entries directly, for
the others using transitivity of ☎.
տ M semimeasure measure
ρ ց rec. est. enum. appr. rec. est. appr.
s rec. noiii noiii noiii noiv noiii noiii noiv
e est. noiii noiii noiii noiv noiii noiii noiv
m enum. yesi yesi yesi noiv yesi yesi noiv
i appr. yesi yesi yesi noiv yesi yesi noiv
m rec. noiii noiii noiii noiv noiii noiii noiv
s est. noiii noiii noiii noiv noiii noiii noiv
r appr. yesii yesii yesii noiv yesii yesii noiv
If we ask for a universal (semi)measure that at least satisfies the weakest form of
computability, namely being approximable, we see that the largest dominated set
among the 7 sets defined above is the set of enumerable semimeasures. This is
the reason why Msemienum plays a special role. On the other hand, Msemienum is not
the largest set dominated by an approximable semimeasure, and indeed no such
largest set exists. One may, hence, ask for “natural” larger sets M. One such set,
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namely the set of cumulatively enumerable semimeasures MCEM, has recently been
discovered by Schmidhuber [Sch00, Sch02], for which even ξCEM∈MCEM holds.
Theorem 4 also holds for discrete (semi)measures P defined as follows:
Definition 6 (Discrete (semi)measures) P (x) denotes the probability of x∈IN .
We call P :IN→ [0,1] a discrete (semi)measure if ∑x∈INP (x) (<)= 1.
Theorem 4 (i) is Levin’s major result [LV97, Thm.4.3.1 & Thm.4.5.1], and (ii) is due
to Solomonoff [Sol78]. The proof of Msemirec 6☎Msemirec in [LV97, p249] contains minor
errors and is not extensible to (iii), and the proof in [LV97, p276] only applies to
infinite alphabet and not to the binary/finite case considered here. Msemiest 6☎Msemiest
is mentioned in [ZL70] without proof. A direct proof of (iv) can be found in [Hut04].
Here, we reduce (iv) to (iii) by exploiting the following elementary fact (well-known
for integer-valued functions, see e.g. [Sim77, p634]):
Lemma 7 (Approximable = H-estimable) A function is approximable iff it is
estimable with the help of the halting oracle.
Proof. With H-computable we mean, computable with the help of the halting
oracle, or equivalently, computable under extra input of the halting sequence h=
h1:∞∈{0,1}∞, where hn=1 :⇔ U(n) halts.
Assume f is approximable, i.e. ∀ε∃y,m :R(m,y,ε), where relation R(m,y,ε) :=
[∀n≥m : |fn(x)−y|<ε] and recursive fn→f . Fix ε>0. Search (dovetail) for m∈IN
and y (∈ 1
2
εZZ is sufficient) such that R(m,y,ε)=true. R is co-enumerable, hence H-
decidable, hence y can beH-computed, hence f isH-estimable, since f(x)=y±O(ε).
Now assume that f is H-estimable, i.e. ∃T ∈TM ∀ε,x : |T (x,ε,h)−f(x)| < ε.
Since h is co-enumerable, T and hence f are approximable. More formally, let
htn=1 :⇔ U(n) halts within t steps. Then g(x,ε) := T (x,ε,h)= T (x,ε,limt→∞ht) =
limt→∞T (x,ε,h
t) is approximable, where the exchange of limits holds, since T only
reads nxε<∞ bits of h and h1:nxε=ht1:nxε for sufficiently large t. ✷
6 Proof of Theorem 4
We first prove the theorem for discrete (semi)measures P (Definition 6), since it
contains the essential ideas in a cleaner form. We then present the proof for con-
tinuous (semi)measures µ (Definition 2). We present proofs for binary alphabet
X = {0,1} only. The proofs naturally generalize from binary to arbitrary finite al-
phabet. argminxf(x) is the x that minimizes f(x). Ties are broken in an arbitrary
but computable way (e.g. by taking the smallest x).
Proof (discrete case).
(o)Q(x):=
∑
P∈MwPP (x) with wP>0 obviously dominates all P∈M (with constant
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wP ). With
∑
PwP =1 and all P being discrete (semi)measures also Q is a discrete
(semi)measure.
(i) See [LV97, Thm.4.3.1].
(ii) Let P be the universal element inMsemienum and α :=
∑
xP (x). We normalize P by
Q(x) := 1
α
P (x). Since α≤1 we have Q(x)≥P (x). Hence Q≥P☎Msemienum. As a ratio
between two enumerable functions, Q is still approximable, hence Mmsrappr☎Msemienum.
(iii) Let P ∈Msemirec . We partition IN into chunks In := {2n−1,...,2n−1} (n≥ 1) of
increasing size. With xn :=argminx∈InP (x) we define Q(xn):=
1
n(n+1)
∀n and Q(x):=0
for all other x. Exploiting that a minimum is smaller than an average and that µ is
a semimeasure, we get
P (xn) = min
x∈In
P (x) ≤ 1|In|
∑
x∈In
P (x) ≤ 1|In| =
1
2n−1
=
n(n + 1)
2n−1
Q(xn)
Since n(n+1)
2n−1
→ 0 for n→∞, P cannot dominate Q (P 6☎Q). With P also Q is
recursive. Since P was an arbitrary recursive semimeasure and Q is a recursive
measure (
∑
Q(x)=
∑
[ 1
n(n+1)
]=
∑
[ 1
n
− 1
n+1
]=1) this implies Msemirec 6☎Mmsrrec .
Assume now that there is an estimable semimeasure S☎Mmsrrec . We construct a
recursive semimeasure P☎S as follows. Choose an initial ε>0 and finitely compute
an ε-approximation Sˆ of S(x). If Sˆ>2ε define P (x):= 1
2
Sˆ, else halve ε and repeat the
process. Since S(x)>0 (otherwise it could not dominate, e.g. T (x):= 1
x(x+1)
∈Mmsrrec )
the loop terminates after finite time. So P is recursive. Inserting Sˆ=2P (x) and ε<
1
2
Sˆ=P (x) into |S(x)−Sˆ|<ε we get |S(x)−2P (x)|<P (x), which implies S(x)≥P (x)
and S(x)≤3P (x). The former implies∑xP (x)≤∑xS(x)≤1, i.e. P is a semimeasure.
The latter implies P ≥ 1
3
S☎Mmsrrec . Hence P is a recursive semimeasure dominating
all recursive measures, which contradicts what we have proven in the first half of
(iii). Hence the assumption on S was wrong which establishes Msemiest 6☎Mmsrrec .
(iv) From (iii) we know that Msemiest 6☎Mmsrest . The proof and hence result
remains valid under the halting oracle, i.e. MsemiH-est 6☎MmsrH-est. By Lemma 7,
the H-estimable functions/(semi)measures coincide with the approximable func-
tions/(semi)measures, hence Msemiappr 6☎Mmsrappr. ✷
Proof (continuous case).
The major difference to the discrete case is that one also has to take care that
ρ(x)
(>)
= ρ(x0)+ρ(x1), x ∈ {0,1}∗, is respected. On the other hand, the chunking
In :={0,1}n is more natural here.
(o) ρ(x) :=
∑
ν∈Mwνν(x) with wν > 0 obviously dominates all ν ∈M (with domi-
nation constant wν). With
∑
νwν = 1 and all ν being (semi)measures also ρ is a
(semi)measure.
(i) See [LV97, Thm.4.5.1].
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(ii) Let ξ be a universal element inMsemienum. We define [Sol78]
ξnorm(x1:n) :=
n∏
t=1
ξ(x1:t)
ξ(x<t0) + ξ(x<t1)
.
By induction one can show that ξnorm is a measure and that ξnorm(x)≥ξ(x)∀x, hence
ξnorm≥ ξ☎Msemienum. As a ratio of enumerable functions, ξnorm is still approximable,
hence Mmsrappr☎Msemienum.
(iii) Analogous to the discrete case we could start by recursively defining x∗k :=
argminxkµ(x
∗
<kxk) for µ∈Msemirec . See [Hut03a] for a proof along this line. Simpler is
to directly consider µ∈Msemiest and to compute x∗1:∞ recursively by computing some
ε-approximation e(xk|x∗<t) of µ(xk|x∗<t) and define x∗k = argmaxxke(xk|x∗<t), which
implies µ(x∗k|x∗<t)≤ 12+ε. Finally we define measure ρ by ρ(x∗1:k)=1∀k and ρ(x)=0
for all x that are not prefixes of x∗1:∞. Hence µ(x
∗
1:n)≤(12+ε)n=(12+ε)nρ(x∗1:n), which
demonstrates that µ does not dominate ρ for ε< 1
2
. Since µ∈Msemiest was arbitrary
and ρ is a recursive measure, this implies Msemiest 6☎Mmsrrec .
(iv) Identical to discrete case. ✷
7 Posterior Convergence
We investigated in detail the computational properties of various mixture distri-
butions ξ. A mixture ξM multiplicatively dominates all distributions in M. We
mentioned that dominance implies posterior convergence. In this section we present
in more detail what dominance implies and what not.
Convergence of ξ(xt|x<t) to µ(xt|x<t) with µ-probability 1 tells us that ξ(xt|x<t)
is close to µ(xt|x<t) for sufficiently large t on ‘most’ sequences x1:∞. It says nothing
about the speed of convergence, nor whether convergence is true for any particular
sequence (of measure 0). Convergence in mean sum defined below is intended to cap-
ture the rate of convergence, Martin-Lo¨f randomness is used to capture convergence
properties for individual sequences.
Martin-Lo¨f randomness is a very important concept of randomness of individ-
ual sequences, which is closely related to Kolmogorov complexity and Solomonoff’s
universal prior. Levin gave a characterization equivalent to Martin-Lo¨f’s original
definition [Lev73]:
Theorem 8 (Martin-Lo¨f random sequences) A sequence x1:∞ is µ-Martin-Lo¨f
random (µ.M.L.) iff there is a constant c such that M(x1:n)≤c·µ(x1:n) for all n.
An equivalent formulation for estimable µ is:
x1:∞ is µ.M.L.-random ⇔ Km(x1:n) = − log µ(x1:n) +O(1) ∀n (7)
Theorem 8 follows from (7) by exponentiation, “using 2−Km≈M” and noting that
M☎µ follows from universality of M . Consider the special case of µ being a fair
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coin, i.e. µ(x1:n)=2
−n, then x1:∞ is M.L. random iff Km(x1:n)=n+O(1), i.e. if x1:n is
incompressible. For general µ, −logµ(x1:n) is the length of the Shannon-Fano code
of x1:n, hence x1:∞ is µ.M.L.-random iff the Shannon-Fano code is optimal.
One can show that a µ.M.L.-random sequence x1:∞ passes all thinkable effective
randomness tests, e.g. the law of large numbers, the law of the iterated logarithm,
etc. In particular, the set of all µ.M.L.-random sequences has µ-measure 1. The
following generalization is natural when considering general Bayes mixtures ξ as in
this work:
Definition 9 (µ/ξ-random sequences) A sequence x1:∞ is called µ/ξ-random
(µ.ξ.r.) iff there is a constant c such that ξ(x1:n)≤c·µ(x1:n) for all n.
Typically, ξ is a mixture over some M as defined in (6), in which case the
reverse inequality ξ(x)☎µ(x) is also true (for all x). For finite M or if ξ∈M, the
definition of µ/ξ-randomness depends only on M, and not on the specific weights
wν used in ξ. For M=Msemienum, µ/ξ-randomness is just µ.M.L.-randomness. The
largerM, the more patterns are recognized as nonrandom. Roughly speaking, those
regularities characterized by some ν∈M are recognized by µ/ξ-randomness, i.e. for
M⊂Msemienum some µ/ξ-random strings may not be M.L. random. Other randomness
concepts, e.g. those by Schnorr, Ko, van Lambalgen, Lutz, Kurtz, von Mises, Wald,
and Church (see [Wan96, Lam87, Sch71]), could possibly also be characterized in
terms of µ/ξ-randomness for particular choices of M.
A classical (nonrandom) real-valued sequence at is defined to converge to a∗,
short at→a∗ if ∀ε∃t0∀t≥t0 : |at−a∗|<ε. We are interested in convergence properties
of random sequences zt(ω) for t→∞ (e.g. zt(ω)=ξ(ωt|ω<t)−µ(ωt|ω<t)). We denote
µ-expectations by E. The expected value of a function f : X t → IR, dependent
on x1:t, independent of xt+1:∞, and possibly undefined on a set of µ-measure 0, is
E[f ] =
∑′
x1:t∈X tµ(x1:t)f(x1:t). The prime denotes that the sum is restricted to x1:t
with µ(x1:t) 6=0. Similarly we use P[..] to denote the µ-probability of event [..]. We
define four convergence concepts for random sequences.
Definition 10 (Convergence of random sequences) Let z1(ω),z2(ω),... be a
sequence of real-valued random variables. zt is said to converge for t→∞ to (random
variable) z∗
i) with probability 1 (w.p.1) :⇔ P[{ω :zt→z∗}]=1,
ii) in mean sum (i.m.s.) :⇔ ∑∞t=1E[(zt−z∗)2]<∞,
iii) for every µ-Martin-Lo¨f random sequence (µ.M.L.) :⇔
∀ω : If [∃c∀n :M(ω1:n)≤cµ(ω1:n)] then zt(ω)→z∗(ω) for t→∞,
iv) for every µ/ξ-random sequence (µ.ξ.r.) :⇔
∀ω : If [∃c∀n :ξ(ω1:n)≤cµ(ω1:n)] then zt(ω)→z∗(ω) for t→∞.
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In statistics, (i) is the “default” characterization of convergence of random sequences.
Convergence i.m.s. (ii) is very strong: it provides a rate of convergence in the sense
that the expected number of times t in which zt deviates more than ε from z∗ is finite
and bounded by c/ε2 and the probability that the number of ε-deviations exceeds
c
ε2δ
is smaller than δ, where c :=
∑∞
t=1E[(zt−z∗)2]. Nothing can be said for which
t these deviations occur. If, additionally, |zt−z∗| were monotone decreasing, then
|zt−z∗|=o(t−1/2) could be concluded. (iii) uses Martin-Lo¨f’s notion of randomness
of individual sequences to define convergence M.L. Since this work deals with general
Bayes mixtures ξ, we generalized in (iv) the definition of convergence M.L. based on
M to convergence µ.ξ.r. based on ξ in a natural way. One can show that convergence
i.m.s. implies convergence w.p.1. Also convergence M.L. implies convergence w.p.1.
Universality of ξ implies the following posterior convergence results:
Theorem 11 (Convergence of ξ to µ) Let there be sequences x1x2... over a fi-
nite alphabet X drawn with probability µ(x1:n)∈M for the first n symbols, where
µ is a measure and M a countable set of (semi)measures. The universal/mixture
posterior probability ξ(xt|x<t) of the next symbol xt given x<t is related to the true
posterior probability µ(xt|x<t) in the following way:
n∑
t=1
E
[(√
ξ(xt|x<t)
µ(xt|x<t)
− 1
)2]
≤
n∑
t=1
E
[∑
x′t
(√
ξ(x′t|x<t)−
√
µ(x′t|x<t)
)2]
≤ lnw−1µ < ∞
where wµ is the weight (6) of µ in ξ.
Theorem 11 implies
√
ξ(x′t|x<t)→
√
µ(x′t|x<t) for any x′t and
√
ξ(xt|x<t)
µ(xt|x<t)
→ 1, both i.m.s. for t→∞.
The latter strengthens the result ξ(xt|x<t)/µ(xt|x<t)→ 1 w.p.1 derived by Ga´cs
[LV97, Thm.5.2.2] in that it also provides the “speed” of convergence.
Note also the subtle difference between the two convergence results. For any se-
quence x′1:∞ (possibly constant and not necessarily µ-random), µ(x
′
t|x<t)−ξ(x′t|x<t)
converges to zero w.p.1 (referring to x1:∞), but no statement is possible for
ξ(x′t|x<t)/µ(x′t|x<t), since lim infµ(x′t|x<t) could be zero. On the other hand, if
we stay on-sequence (x′1:∞=x1:∞), we have ξ(xt|x<t)/µ(xt|x<t)→1 w.p.1 (whether
infµ(xt|x<t) tends to zero or not does not matter). Indeed, it is easy to give an
example where ξ(x′t|x<t)/µ(x′t|x<t) diverges. If we choose
M = {µ1, µ2}, µ≡µ1, µ1(1|x<t) = 12t−3 and µ2(1|x<t) = 12t−2
the contribution of µ2 to ξ causes ξ to fall off like µ2∼t−2, much slower than µ∼t−3
causing the quotient to diverge:
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µ1(01:n) =
n∏
t=1
(1− 1
2
t−3)
n→∞−→ c1 = 0.450... > 0 ⇒ 01:∞ is a µ-random sequence,
µ2(01:n) =
n∏
t=1
(1− 1
2
t−2)
n→∞−→ c2 = 0.358... > 0 ⇒ ξ(01:n)→ w1c1 + w2c2 =: cξ > 0
ξ(0<t1) = w1µ1(1|0<t)µ1(0<t) + w2µ2(1|0<t)µ2(0<t)→ 12w2c2t−2
⇒ ξ(1|0<t) = ξ(0<t1)
ξ(0<t)
→ w2c2
2cξ
t−2 ⇒ ξ(1|0<t)
µ(1|0<t) →
w2c2
cξ
t→∞ diverges.
Proof. For a probability distribution yi≥0 with ∑iyi=1 and a semi-distribution
zi≥0 with ∑izi≤1 and i={1,...,N}, the Hellinger distance h(~y,~z) :=∑i(√yi−√zi)2
is upper bounded by the relative entropy d(~y,~z)=
∑
iyiln
yi
zi
(and 0ln0
z
:=0). This can
be seen as follows: For arbitrary 0≤y≤1 and 0≤z≤1 we define
f(y, z) := y ln
y
z
− (√y −√z)2 + z − y = 2yg(
√
z/y)
with g(t) := − ln t+ t− 1 ≥ 0.
This shows f≥0, and hence ∑if(yi,zi)≥0, which implies∑
i
yi ln
yi
zi
−∑
i
(
√
yi −√zi)2 ≥
∑
i
yi −
∑
i
zi ≥ 1− 1 = 0.
The (conditional) µ-expectations of a function f :X t→IR are defined as
E[f ] =
∑′
x1:t∈X t
µ(x1:t)f(x1:t) and Et[f ] := E[f |x<t] =
∑′
xt∈X
µ(xt|x<t)f(x1:t),
where
∑′ sums over all xt or x1:t for which µ(x1:t) 6=0. If we insert X = {1,...,N},
N=|X |, i=xt, yi=µt :=µ(xt|x<t), and zi=ξt :=ξ(xt|x<t) into h and d we get (w.p.1)
ht(x<t) :=
∑
xt(
√
µt−
√
ξt)
2 ≤ dt(x<t) := ∑xt µt ln µtξt = Et[ln µtξt ].
Taking the expectation E and the sum
∑n
t=1 we get
n∑
t=1
E[dt(x<t)] =
n∑
t=1
E[Et[ln
µt
ξt
]] = E[ln
n∏
t=1
µt
ξt
] = E[ln
µ(x1:n)
ξ(x1:n)
] ≤ lnw−1µ (8)
where we have used E[Et[..]]=E[..] and exchanged the t-sum with the expectation
E, which transforms to a product inside the logarithm. In the last equality we have
used the chain rule for µ and ξ. Using universality ξ(x1:n)≥wµµ(x1:n) yields the
final inequality. Finally
Et
[(√ ξt
µt
− 1
)2]
=
∑
xt
′µt
(√ ξt
µt
− 1
)2
=
∑
xt
′(
√
ξt −√µt)2 ≤ ht(x<t) ≤ dt(x<t).
Taking the expectation E and the sum
∑n
t=1 and chaining the result with (8) yields
Theorem 11. ✷
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8 Convergence in Martin-Lo¨f Sense
An interesting open question is whether ξ converges to µ (in difference or ratio)
individually for all Martin-Lo¨f random sequences. Clearly, convergence µ.M.L.
may at most fail for a set of sequences with µ-measure zero. A convergence
M.L. result would be particularly interesting and natural for Solomonoff’s universal
prior M , since M.L. randomness can be defined in terms of M (see Theorem 8).
Attempts to convert the bounds in Theorem 11 to effective µ.M.L.-randomness
tests fail, since M(xt|x<t) is not enumerable. The proof of M/µ M.L.−→ 1 given in
[LV97, Thm.5.2.2] and [VL00, Thm.10] is incomplete.1 The implication “M(x1:n)≤
c·µ(x1:n)∀n⇒ limn→∞M(x1:n)/µ(x1:n) exists” has been used, but not proven, and is
indeed generally wrong [HM04]. Theorem 8 only implies supnM(x1:n)/µ(x1:n)<∞
for M.L. random sequences x1:∞, and [Doo53, pp. 324–325] implies only that
limn→∞M(x1:n)/µ(x1:n) exists w.p.1, and not µ.M.L. Vovk [Vov87] shows that for
two estimable semimeasures µ and ρ and x1:∞ being µ and ρ M.L. random that
∞∑
t=1
∑
x′t
(√
µ(x′t|x<t)−
√
ρ(x′t|x<t)
)2
<∞ and
∞∑
t=1
(
ρ(xt|x<t)
µ(xt|x<t) − 1
)2
<∞.
If M were estimable, then this would imply posterior M → µ and M/µ→ 1 for
every µ.M.L.-random sequence x1:∞, since every sequence is M .M.L. random. Since
M is not estimable, Vovk’s theorem cannot be applied and it is not obvious how
to generalize it. So the question of individual convergence remains open. More
generally, one may ask whether ξM→ µ for every µ/ξ-random sequence. It turns
out that this is true for some M, but false for others.
Theorem 12 (µ/ξ-convergence of ξ to µ) Let X = {0,1} be binary and MΘ :=
{µθ :µθ(1|x<t)=θ ∀t, θ∈Θ} be the set of Bernoulli(θ) distributions with parameters
θ∈Θ. Let ΘD be a countable dense subset of [0,1], e.g. [0,1]∩IQ, and let ΘG be a
countable subset of [0,1] with a gap in the sense that there exist 0<θ0<θ1<1 such
that [θ0,θ1]∩ΘG={θ0,θ1}, e.g. ΘG={14 ,12} or ΘG=([0,14 ]∪[12 ,1])∩IQ. Then
i) If x1:∞ is µ/ξMΘD random with µ∈MΘD , then ξMΘD (xt|x<t)→µ(xt|x<t),
ii) There are µ ∈MΘG and µ/ξMΘG random x1:∞ for which ξMΘG(xt|x<t) 6→
µ(xt|x<t)
1The formulation of their theorem is quite misleading in general: “Let µ be a positive recursive
measure. If the length of y is fixed and the length of x grows to infinity, then M(y|x)/µ(y|x)→1
with µ-probability one. The infinite sequences ω with prefixes x satisfying the displayed asymptotics
are precisely [‘⇒’ and ‘⇐’] the µ-random sequences.” First, for off-sequence y convergence w.p.1
does not hold (xy must be demanded to be a prefix of ω). Second, the proof of ‘⇐’ has gaps (see
main text). Last, ‘⇒’ is given without proof and is wrong [HM04]. Also the assertion in [LV97,
Thm.5.2.1] that St :=E
∑
x′
t
(µ(x′
t
|x<t)−M(x′t|x<t))2 converges to zero faster than 1/t cannot be
made, since St does not decrease monotonically [Hut04, Prob.2.7]. For example, for at :=1/
√
t if t
is a cube and 0 otherwise, we have
∑
∞
t=1
at<∞, but at 6=o(1/t).
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Our original/main motivation of studying µ/ξ-randomness is the implication of The-
orem 12 that M
M.L.−→µ cannot be decided from M being a mixture distribution or
from the universality property (Theorem 3) alone. Further structural properties
of Msemienum have to be employed. For Bernoulli sequences, convergence µ.ξMΘ .r. is
related to denseness of MΘ. Maybe a denseness characterization of Msemienum can
solve the question of convergence M.L. of M . The property M ∈Msemienum is also not
sufficient to resolve this question, since there areM∋ξ for which ξ µ.ξ.r−→µ andM∋ξ
for which ξ 6µ.ξ.r−→µ. Theorem 12 can be generalized to i.i.d. sequences over general
finite alphabet X .
The idea to prove (ii) is to construct a sequence x1:∞ that is µθ0/ξ-random and
µθ1/ξ-random for θ0 6=θ1. This is possible if and only if Θ contains a gap and θ0 and
θ1 are the boundaries of the gap. Obviously ξ cannot converge to θ0 and θ1, thus
proving non-convergence. For no θ∈ [0,1] will this x1:∞ be µθ M.L.-random. Finally,
the proof of Theorem 12 makes essential use of the mixture representation of ξ, as
opposed to the proof of Theorem 11 which only needs dominance ξ☎M.
An example for (ii) is M= {µ0,µ1}, µ0(1|x<t) = µ1(0|x<t) = 14 , x1:∞= (01)∞=
01010101... ⇒ µ0(x1:2n) = µ1(x1:2n) = ξ(x1:2n) = (14)n(34)n ⇒ x1:∞ is µ0/ξ-random
and µ1/ξ-random, but µ0(x2n|x<2n) = 14 , µ0(x2n+1|x1:2n) = 34 , µ1(x2n|x<2n) = 34 ,
µ1(x2n+1|x1:2n) = 14 and ξ(x2n|x<2n) = 38 , ξ(x2n+1|x1:2n) = 12 for w0 = w1 = 12 ⇒
ξ(xn|x<n) 6→µ0/1(xn|x<n).
Proof. Let X ={0,1} andM={µθ :θ∈Θ} with countable Θ⊂ [0,1] and µθ(1|x1:n)=
θ=1−µθ(0|x1:n), which implies
µθ(x1:n) = θ
n1(1− θ)n−n1, n1 := x1+ ...+xn, θˆ ≡ θˆn := n1
n
θˆ depends on n; all other used/defined θ will be independent of n. We assume θ··∈Θ,
where .. stands for some (possible empty) index, and θ¨∈ [0,1] (possibly 6∈Θ), where¨
stands for some superscript, i.e. µθ·· and wθ·· make sense, whereas µθ¨ and wθ¨ do not.
ξ is defined in the standard way as
ξ(x1:n) =
∑
θ∈Θ
wθµθ(x1:n) ⇒ ξ(x1:n) ≥ wθµθ(x1:n), (9)
where
∑
θwθ=1 and wθ>0 ∀θ. In the following let µ=µθ0∈M be the true environ-
ment.
ω = x1:∞ is µ/ξ-random ⇔ ∃cω : ξ(x1:n) ≤ cω ·µθ0(x1:n) ∀n (10)
For binary alphabet it is sufficient to establish whether ξ(1|x1:n)n→∞−→ θ0≡µ(1|x1:n) for
µ/ξ-random x1:∞ in order to decide ξ(xn|x<n)→µ(xn|x<n). We need the following
posterior representation of ξ:
ξ(1|x1:n) =
∑
θ∈Θ
wθnµθ(1|x1:n), wθn := wθ
µθ(x1:n)
ξ(x1:n)
≤ wθ
wθ0
µθ(x1:n)
µθ0(x1:n)
,
∑
θ∈Θ
wθn = 1 (11)
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The ratio µθ/µθ0 can be represented as follows:
µθ(x1:n)
µθ0(x1:n)
=
θn1(1−θ)n−n1
θn10 (1−θ0)n−n1
=
[(
θ
θ0
)θˆn( 1−θ
1−θ0
)1−θˆn]n
= en[D(θˆn||θ0)−D(θˆn||θ)]
(12)
where D(θˆ||θ) = θˆ ln θˆ
θ
+ (1−θˆ) ln 1−θˆ
1−θ
is the relative entropy between θˆ and θ, which is continuous in θˆ and θ, and is 0 if
and only if θˆ=θ. We also need the following implication for sets Ω⊆Θ:
If wθn ≤ wθgθ(n) n→∞−→ 0 and gθ(n) ≤ c ∀θ∈Ω,
then
∑
θ∈Ω
wθnµθ(1|x1:n) ≤
∑
θ∈Ω
wθn
n→∞−→ 0, (13)
which easily follows from boundedness
∑
θw
θ
n≤1 and µθ≤1 [Hut04, Lem.5.28ii]. We
now prove Theorem 12. We leave the special considerations necessary when 0,1∈Θ
to the reader and assume, henceforth, 0,1 6∈Θ.
(i) Let Θ be a countable dense subset of (0,1) and x1:∞ be µ/ξ-random. Using
(9) and (10) in (12) for θ∈Θ to be determined later we can bound
en[D(θˆn||θ0)−D(θˆn||θ)] =
µθ(x1:n)
µθ0(x1:n)
≤ cω
wθ
=: c <∞ (14)
Let us assume that θˆ≡ θˆn 6→θ0. This implies that there exists a cluster point θ˜ 6=θ0
of sequence θˆn, i.e. θˆn is infinitely often in an ε-neighborhood of θ˜, e.g. D(θˆn||θ˜)≤ε
for infinitely many n. θ˜∈ [0,1] may be outside Θ. Since θ˜ 6= θ0 this implies that θˆn
must be “far” away from θ0 infinitely often. For instance, for ε=
1
4
(θ˜−θ0)2, using
D(θˆ||θ˜)+D(θˆ||θ0)≥ (θ˜−θ0)2, we get D(θˆ||θ0)≥ 3ε. We now choose θ ∈Θ so near
to θ˜ such that |D(θˆ||θ)−D(θˆ||θ˜)| ≤ ε (here we use denseness of Θ). Chaining all
inequalities we get D(θˆ||θ0)−D(θˆ||θ)≥ 3ε−ε−ε= ε > 0. This, together with (14)
implies enε ≤ c for infinitely many n which is impossible. Hence, the assumption
θˆn 6→θ0 was wrong.
Now, θˆn→ θ0 implies that for arbitrary θ 6= θ0, θ∈Θ and for sufficiently large n
there exists δθ> 0 such that D(θˆn||θ)≥ 2δθ (since D(θ0||θ) 6=0) and D(θˆn||θ0)≤ δθ.
This implies
wθn ≤
wθ
wθ0
en[D(θˆn||θ0)−D(θˆn||θ)] ≤ wθ
wθ0
e−nδθ
n→∞−→ 0,
where we have used (11) and (12) in the first inequality and the second inequality
holds for sufficiently large n. Hence
∑
θ 6=θ0w
θ
n→0 by (13) and wθ0n →1 by normaliza-
tion (11), which finally gives
ξ(1|x1:n) = wθ0n µθ0(1|x1:n) +
∑
θ 6=θ0
wθnµθ(1|x1:n) n→∞−→ µθ0(1|x1:n).
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(ii) We first consider the case Θ = {θ0,θ1}: Let us choose θ¯ (=
ln(1−θ0
1−θ1
)/ln( θ1
θ0
1−θ0
1−θ1
) 6∈Θ) in the (KL) middle of θ0 and θ1 such that
D(θ¯||θ0) = D(θ¯||θ1), 0 < θ0 < θ¯ < θ1 < 1, (15)
and choose x1:∞ such that θˆn :=
n1
n
satisfies |θˆn − θ¯| ≤ 1n (⇒ θˆn
n→∞−→ θ¯)
We will show that x1:∞ is µθ0/ξ-random and µθ1/ξ-random. Obviously no ξ can
converge to θ0 and θ1, thus proving M-non-convergence. (x1:∞ is obviously not
µθ0/1 M.L.-random, since the relative frequency θˆn 6→θ0/1. x1:∞ is not even µθ¯ M.L.-
random, since θˆn converges too fast (∼ 1n). x1:∞ is indeed very regular, whereas n1n
of a truly µθ¯ M.L.-random sequence has fluctuations of the order 1/
√
n. The fast
convergence is necessary for doubly µ/ξ-randomness. The reason that x1:∞ is µ/ξ-
random, but not M.L.-random is that µ/ξ-randomness is a weaker concept than
M.L.-randomness for M⊂Msemienum. Only regularities characterized by ν ∈M are
recognized by µ/ξ-randomness.)
In the following we assume that n is sufficiently large such that θ0≤ θˆn≤θ1. We
need
|D(θˆ||θ)−D(θ¯||θ)| ≤ c|θˆ − θ¯| ∀ θ, θˆ, θ¯ ∈ [θ0, θ1] with c := ln θ1(1−θ0)θ0(1−θ1) <∞ (16)
which follows for θˆ≥ θ¯ (similarly θˆ≤ θ¯) from
D(θˆ||θ)−D(θ¯||θ) =
∫ θˆ
θ¯
[ln θ
′
θ
− ln 1−θ′
1−θ
]dθ′ ≤
∫ θˆ
θ¯
[ln θ1
θ0
− ln 1−θ1
1−θ0
]dθ′ = c·(θˆ − θ¯)
where we have increased θ′ to θ1 and decreased θ to θ0 in the inequality. Using (16)
in (12) twice we get
µθ1(x1:n)
µθ0(x1:n)
= en[D(θˆn||θ0)−D(θˆn||θ1)] ≤ en[D(θ¯||θ0)+c|θˆn−θ¯|−D(θ¯||θ1)+c|θˆn−θ¯|] ≤ e2c (17)
where we have used (15) in the last inequality. Now, (17) and (11) lead to
wθ0n = wθ0
µθ0(x1:n)
ξ(x1:n)
= [1 +
wθ1
wθ0
µθ1(x1:n)
µθ0(x1:n)
]−1 ≥ [1 + wθ1
wθ0
e2c]−1 =: c0 > 0, (18)
which shows that x1:∞ is µθ0/ξ-random by (10). Exchanging θ0↔θ1 in (17) and (18)
we similarly get wθ1n ≥c1>0, which implies (using wθ0n +wθ1n =1)
ξ(1|x1:n) =
∑
θ∈{θ0,θ1}
wθnµθ(1|x1:n) = wθ0n ·θ0 + wθ1n ·θ1 6= θ0 = µθ0(1|x1:n). (19)
This shows ξ(1|x1:n) 6n→∞−→ µ(1|x1:n). One can show that ξ(1|x1:n) does not only not
converge to θ0 (and θ1), but that it does not converge at all. The fast convergence
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demand |θˆn−θ¯|≤ 1n on x1:∞ can be weakened to θˆn≤ θ¯+O( 1n) ∀n and θˆn≥ θ¯−O( 1n)
for infinitely many n, then x1:∞ is still µθ0/ξ-random, and w
θ1
n ≥c′1>0 for infinitely
many n, which is sufficient to prove ξ 6→µ.
We now consider general Θ with gap in the sense that there exist 0 < θ0 <
θ1< 1 with [θ0,θ1]∩Θ= {θ0,θ1}: We show that all θ 6= θ0,θ1 give asymptotically no
contribution to ξ(1|x1:n), i.e. (19) still applies. Let θ∈Θ\{θ0,θ1}; all other definitions
as before. Then δθ :=D(θ¯||θ)−D(θ¯||θ0/1)>0, since θ is farther than θ0/1 away from
θ¯ (|θ−θ¯|> |θ0/1−θ¯|). Similarly to (17) with θ instead θ1 we get
µθ(x1:n)
µθ0(x1:n)
= en[D(θˆn||θ0)−D(θˆn||θ)] ≤ e2c ·en[D(θ¯||θ0)−D(θ¯||θ)] = e2ce−nδθ n→∞−→ 0
Hence wθn≤ wθwθ0 e
2ce−nδθ→0 from (11) and εn :=∑θ∈Θ\{θ0,θ1}wθnµθ(1|x1:n) n→∞−→ 0 from
(13). Hence ξ(1|x1:n)=wθ0n ·θ0+wθ1n ·θ1+εn 6=θ0=µθ0(1|x1:n) for sufficiently large n,
since εn→0, wθ1n ≥c′1>0 and θ0 6=θ1. ✷
9 Conclusions
For a hierarchy of four computability definitions, we completed the classifica-
tion of the existence of computable (semi)measures dominating all computable
(semi)measures. Dominance is an important property of a prior, since it implies
rapid convergence of the corresponding posterior with probability one. A strength-
ening would be convergence for all Martin-Lo¨f (M.L.) random sequences. This seems
natural, since M.L. randomness can be defined in terms of Solomonoff’s prior M , so
there is a close connection. Contrary to what was believed before, the question of
posterior convergence M/µ→1 for all M.L. random sequences is still open. Some ex-
citing progress has been made recently in [HM04], partially answering this question.
We introduced a new flexible notion of µ/ξ-randomness which contains Martin-Lo¨f
randomness as a special case. Though this notion may have a wider range of ap-
plication, the main purpose for its introduction was to show that standard proof
attempts of M/µ
M.L.−→ 1 based on dominance only must fail. This follows from the
derived result that the validity of ξ/µ→1 for µ/ξ-random sequences depends on the
Bayes mixture ξ.
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